The Afghanistan war (2001-present) is not the longest war in American history. The United States has been at war in Korea since 1950. An armistice was signed in 1953, putting an end to large-scale military conflicts, even though sabotage, artillery duels, raids and unprovoked attacks continue. No truce treaty has ever been signed. A state of war — undeclared and unofficial because the "Korean War" is officially known as a United Nations "police action" — has existed ever since.
Attention has turned to this unending war recently because of North Korea's launch of an ICBM and its possession of nuclear warheads. Generations of American presidents have attempted to rein in the Kim dynasty that has ruled North Korea for three generations without result. North Korea continues to pursue a highly militarized, very aggressive and extremely dangerous policy of confronting and threatening the United States, South Korea and Japan. Offers of food for its starving population, fuel oil to fuel industries and other assistance have not resulted in policy change in North Korea.
Author Mark Bowden's cover story in this month's Atlantic offers four options for dealing with North Korea, each of them fraught with catastrophic dangers and slim chances of success. The options range from a pre-emptive strike to take out North Korea's leadership along with its missiles and nuclear warheads to an acceptance that North Korea isn't going to change and can't be defeated without a war so intense that it threatens civilization and humanity. Bowden concludes that there are no good options and worries that President Trump, nearly as bombastic and unpredictable as North Korea's Kim Jong Un, could misjudge the situation and unintentionally start a war that would kill hundreds of millions in North Korea, South Korea, Japan and the United States.
Start with this premise: Diplomacy is preferable to war. North Korea might be uninterested in more food, more fuel or more cash, but it might be interested in a truce that ends the nearly 70-year state of war. Offer that as an incentive to halt ICBM development and deployment and an end to nuclear weaponry and cross-border raids. In exchange, vow to reduce U.S. presence in South Korea, sign a treaty between the two Koreas (without merging the two), increase trade and visits between North and South Korea, reduce the size of both nations' military, and "normalize" relations between North and South.
Kim might not agree to these provisions, but they can be a starting point for negotiations. The other impetus in this negotiation would be the certainty that, even if Kim develops a substantial nuclear threat, any use of nukes would result in a counter-attack that would turn the northern half of the Korean peninsula into a radioactive and burning wasteland — the equivalent of the "Mutually Assured Destruction" that avoided nuclear devastation during the Cold War.
Showing posts with label North Korea. Show all posts
Showing posts with label North Korea. Show all posts
Friday, July 7, 2017
Monday, May 24, 2010
When an 'act of war' doesn't end in war
A hostile foreign power sinks a warship, killing scores of crew members. What will be the result?
This is not a backgrounder on the USS Maine, which sunk in Havana Harbor in 1898. In that case, the result, despite a lack of evidence that Spain had anything to do with the U.S. battleship's sinking, was "a splendid little war," which the United States won handily. No, this case involves two nations with the same last name — Korea — and two very different economic and political systems. On March 26, the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan was struck by an underwater explosion, killing 46 sailors and sending the ship to the bottom of the ocean. Two months later, investigators have announced that the ship was sunk by a torpedo that had originated in North Korea. Despite the carefully reconstructed evidence, North Korea denies having any responsibility for the sinking, which occurred in waters near the two countries' international boundary.
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has officially blamed North Korea and has announced a series of economic measures and restrictions that fall far short of a declaration of war, which would seem to be warranted after this classic "act of war." For its part, North Korea warns that any sanctions against the secretive, closed Stalinist regime would mean "all-out war."
The Korean peninsula, divided since the end of World War II into a repressive, communist North and a Western-leaning and economically vibrant South, personifies the Cold War maxim of "mutually assured destruction." That doctrine held that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could risk war because each held sufficient numbers of nuclear weapons to obliterate the other, even in a retaliatory strike after an initial attack. In Korea, nuclear weapons are not the key to the MADness, although North Korea possesses a few nuclear weapons, and U.S. troops stationed in and near South Korea have nuclear capabilities. Even a conventional war between the Koreas would be madness, as the world learned in 1950-53. All-out war would devastate both countries, and although South Korea might ultimately prevail, its economic advancements of the past half-century would be wiped away. U.S. war game exercises conclude that North Korea's defeat might unleash chaos that would envelope the whole reunion and be felt around the globe.
Maybe that's why South Korea, recognizing that it has been attacked by a foreign power whose sinking of a sovereign warship was, indeed, an "act of war," is willing to settle for something less than a retaliatory military strike. President Lee wants an apology and punishment for those responsible. What remains mysterious is why Kim Jong Il's North Korean regime would so foolhardily commit an act of war and thereby risk the obliteration of two nations.
This is not a backgrounder on the USS Maine, which sunk in Havana Harbor in 1898. In that case, the result, despite a lack of evidence that Spain had anything to do with the U.S. battleship's sinking, was "a splendid little war," which the United States won handily. No, this case involves two nations with the same last name — Korea — and two very different economic and political systems. On March 26, the South Korean Navy ship Cheonan was struck by an underwater explosion, killing 46 sailors and sending the ship to the bottom of the ocean. Two months later, investigators have announced that the ship was sunk by a torpedo that had originated in North Korea. Despite the carefully reconstructed evidence, North Korea denies having any responsibility for the sinking, which occurred in waters near the two countries' international boundary.
South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has officially blamed North Korea and has announced a series of economic measures and restrictions that fall far short of a declaration of war, which would seem to be warranted after this classic "act of war." For its part, North Korea warns that any sanctions against the secretive, closed Stalinist regime would mean "all-out war."
The Korean peninsula, divided since the end of World War II into a repressive, communist North and a Western-leaning and economically vibrant South, personifies the Cold War maxim of "mutually assured destruction." That doctrine held that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could risk war because each held sufficient numbers of nuclear weapons to obliterate the other, even in a retaliatory strike after an initial attack. In Korea, nuclear weapons are not the key to the MADness, although North Korea possesses a few nuclear weapons, and U.S. troops stationed in and near South Korea have nuclear capabilities. Even a conventional war between the Koreas would be madness, as the world learned in 1950-53. All-out war would devastate both countries, and although South Korea might ultimately prevail, its economic advancements of the past half-century would be wiped away. U.S. war game exercises conclude that North Korea's defeat might unleash chaos that would envelope the whole reunion and be felt around the globe.
Maybe that's why South Korea, recognizing that it has been attacked by a foreign power whose sinking of a sovereign warship was, indeed, an "act of war," is willing to settle for something less than a retaliatory military strike. President Lee wants an apology and punishment for those responsible. What remains mysterious is why Kim Jong Il's North Korean regime would so foolhardily commit an act of war and thereby risk the obliteration of two nations.
Thursday, August 6, 2009
Back in the news: It's Bill Clinton

Bill Clinton is back, and this time he's doing well by doing good. The former president is freshly back from a private mission to North Korea, where he met with the enigmatic and reportedly ailing "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il and obtained pardons for two American journalists who had been convicted by North Korea of spying. It's a fortuitous revival for the former president, who was last in the public eye campaigning for his wife, now-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Suffice it to say that Bill Clinton appears to have done a better job with the North Koreans than with 2008 Democratic primary voters.
And let's admit a deserved compliment for his wife. I, for one, thought the appointment of Sen. Hillary Clinton to be secretary of state was a bad idea. I thought her ego and independence were too big for this sensitive and ceremonial job. But she has sublimated her ego and has led the administration's efforts to mend fences around the world while keeping pressure on adversarial regimes such as Iran and North Korea. She's proving herself in this new and very different role.
But back to her husband. Bill Clinton accepted this mission at the apparent behest of Kim Jong Il, who seems to have an affection for Western celebrities. Kim reportedly turned down other emissaries and insisted on the 42nd president himself. According to at least one account, the usually ebullient and unpredictable Clinton maintained a disciplined, disinterested and business-like demeanor throughout the meeting with Kim, who behaved more like a thrilled and starry-eyed teenager. Clinton returned to the United States looking like a disciplined, credit-deflecting professional, with the pardoned and appreciative journalists.
What everyone wants to know is what does this diplomatic coup mean for relations with nuclear-armed and belligerent North Korea. No one really knows, but it's the first hopeful sign from the Kim regime in years. The Obama administration emphasized that Clinton carried no official message on what it described as a private trip. But the president and secretary of state will surely try to capitalize on any slight opening Clinton's meeting with Kim might imply. North Korea might well be the most volatile nation in the world, a bigger challenge than Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan. If diplomatic efforts can take this ticking bomb off the table, it will be easier for the United States to deal with other international problems.
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